OPINION
As the party-state system that runs China betray lack of institutional resilience to manage complex challenges, Tenzin Lungtok* sees both dangers and opportunities for Tibet in the ongoing scenario.
Power Struggle Dynamics,
The Military Purge Wave
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign within the People’s Liberation Army is unprecedented. Over three years (2023-2026), five of seven Central Military Commission members have been investigated or removed for “serious disciplinary violations”—code language signalling political disloyalty. The purge accelerated dramatically in October 2025 with the downfall of CMC Vice-Chairman He Weidong, followed in January 2026 by investigations into General Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.
Official accusations emphasize “trampling on the Chairman Responsibility System,” not conventional corruption charges. This rhetorical distinction matters: it signals that these officers defied Xi’s direct orders rather than engaging primarily in bribery or embezzlement. Zhang Youxia, a childhood friend of Xi and the son of a revolutionary general, held exceptional status. His removal—despite his red princeling credentials and prior role assisting Xi’s purges of rival officers—demonstrates that Xi tolerates no disagreement, even from trusted confidants.
The Zhang Youxia Dispute
Military analysts identify the core conflict: Zhang’s force-building agenda diverged fundamentally from Xi’s timeline expectations. Xi demanded that the PLA achieve joint operational capability for a Taiwan invasion by 2027; Zhang favored consolidating training deficiencies by 2027 and only then pursuing full joint operations capability toward 2035.
Zhang Youxia’s Letter (Alleged)
A purported letter attributed to General Zhang, circulating since late January 2026, alleges that he opposed Xi’s reckless pursuit of war and criticized Xi for surrounding himself with “sycophants” who flattered his ambitions to rival Mao Zedong. While the letter’s authenticity remains contested—some analysts question its coherence and flow—it aligns with observable patterns: during the 2025 Two Sessions, neither Zhang nor Liu publicly affirmed the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” (a required loyalty signal), and Zhang stood with his back toward Xi during official proceedings, an extraordinarily provocative gesture in hierarchical CCP protocol.
CCP Elder Discontent
Beyond the PLA, retired party leaders including Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, and former President Hu Jintao have quietly expressed disapproval of Xi’s policies since the Third Plenum in July 2024. Though Xi has restricted these elders’ movements and meeting privileges, their symbolic positioning—Wen and Li flanking Xi at October 2024 state functions—signals that organized opposition exists within the party elite. Rumors of a “Xishan Consensus” suggest elders are exploring mechanisms for managed succession, though their leverage remains limited.
The driving discontent stems from Xi’s economic mismanagement (prioritizing military spending over innovation, exacerbating youth unemployment), foreign policy aggressiveness, and centralization of power in ways that the post-Mao CCP had apparently reformed away from.
Implications for Tibet
Xi’s internal instability has produced contradictory effects on Tibet policy. Publicly, Sinicization has accelerated: the November 2025 Tibet Autonomous Region legislative session emphasized “Sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism,” appointing Han Chinese clerics, and promoting Han settlement in border areas through demographic dilution policies. Military infrastructure expansion along the India-Tibet border has intensified, with PLA construction of logistics hubs, airfields, and dual-use civilian settlements designed to rapidly mobilize forces.
Risks: Internal party crisis may drive Xi toward aggressive nationalism and securitization of frontier regions as a way to consolidate support among security apparatus and military. Tibet bears the brunt: expanded surveillance, accelerated cultural assimilation and militarization.
Opportunities: Conversely, factional paralysis and purge-induced institutional chaos may slow implementation of ambitious Sinicization goals. Resource-strapped military facing internal uncertainty may deprioritize nation-building in Tibet relative to PLA consolidation.
Diaspora advocates and international human rights bodies can use those policy windows to document and publicize accelerating oppression, potentially attracting sanctions or international diplomatic pressure.
The trajectory toward “transforming Tibet from a cost center to a profit center by 2049” remains intact, but execution may face delays or inconsistencies.
For border security, China’s dual-use infrastructure expansion might continue regardless of internal party dynamics, as India-China tensions transcend factional disputes.
Conclusion
China’s simultaneous crises—military purges, elder discontent, factional tensions, and strategic military disagreements—signal that the CCP system lacks the institutional resilience to manage complex challenges.
Xi’s concentration of power has traded long-term adaptability for short-term control, creating a brittle, personality-dependent regime vulnerable to miscalculation.
For Tibet, this moment offers both danger and possibility: danger of intensified militarization as Xi consolidates power through nationalism; possibility of implementation delays in Sinicization policies if institutional chaos persists.
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* Tenzin Lungtog is a private researcher currently working for the Central Tibetan Administration