(TibetanReview.net, Mar30’24) — The heightened level of bonhomie seen in India-Bhutan relations in recent times has prompted a Chinese academic to warn that it could have “obvious and direct” impacts on China’s efforts to resolve its long-running occupied-Tibet border dispute with the Himalayan kingdom.
During his visit to Bhutan last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed a partnership that “is not limited to land and water”. He doubled India’s Five-Year Plan assistance to Bhutan to more than $1 billion; was hosted a private dinner by King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck at his Lingkana Palace; and became the first foreigner to be honoured with the Order of the Druk Gyalpo, or Dragon King, Bhutan’s most prestigious civilian award.
Modi’s Mar 22-23 trip came just a week after Bhutan’s Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay, newly elected in Jan 2024, held talks in Delhi with top Indian leaders.
Tshering Tobgay’s predecessor Lotay Tshering was seen as being overly anxious to settle the Tibet-border dispute with China, which likely involves land swaps that would gravely compromise India’s security concerns, although he sought to allay any such concern.
Anyhow, Lotay Tshering made it clear that the border dispute could be settled soon – in the next two or so rounds of talks between the two sides – which was seen as having given rise to misgivings in New Delhi.
But in light of recent developments, Lin Minwang, deputy director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, has said the impact on Chinese-Bhutan border talks could be “obvious and direct”.
“We have seen some momentum since 2020 and the negotiations have achieved significant progress,” the scmp.com Mar 29 quoted Lin as saying.
“The two sides are (a)waiting for an opportunity of breakthrough but now I think there could be some changes.”
But it has never been clear how far the border negotiations had advanced since neither Beijing nor Thimphu disclosed details.
Nevertheless, the report noted that in an interview with The Hindu last year, then-Bhutanese prime minister Lotay Tshering – considered a China-friendly figure – had said that the two countries were “inching towards the completion” of a three-step road map on boundary delineation. A land swap involving the Bhutan-controlled Doklam area was stated to be among the proposals, although Bhutan made it clear that any such talks should necessarily involve India as an interested party.
China first proposed a “package deal” in 1996 to trade Jakarlung and Pasamlung for a smaller tract of disputed area around Doklam, Sinchulumpa and Gieu, but Bhutan backed off. In 1998, the two sides instead signed an agreement to pause negotiations, pending further talks, the report noted.
Reflecting Beijing’s thinking and hope, Lin has said the territorial disputes between China and Bhutan were “not that big in principle”.
“The core issue is if Bhutan has made up its mind to resolve the disputes – and if it is willing to defy India.”
Despite Bhutan’s assurances, India is seen as being deeply wary of any land swap, which would give China a strategic advantage in the Doklam plateau. The plateau is close to the Siliguri Corridor a strip of land that is around 20km (14 miles) wide at its narrowest point that connects India’s eight northeastern states as well as a part of West Bengal to the rest of the country. Such a swap could expand India’s vulnerabilities to the Chinese in occupied Tibet, with the two Asian powers already at loggerheads over their disputed Himalayan borders stretching over more than three thousand kilometres.
After comments by Lotay Tshering (prime minister from 2013 to 2018 on a possible land swap with Beijing, there were discussions in India about whether Thimphu was struggling to reach a deal without Delhi’s backing; and the former prime minister had to clarify that there was no change in position by Bhutan, the report said.
In broader terms, while India’s relation with China has remained soured since the 2020 violent border clashes along the Ladakh border, the latter has steadily pushed for closer ties with other South Asian nations, including Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal, hosting their leaders in Beijing and financing a number of infrastructure projects in the region.