(TibetanReview.net, Nov20’25) – The 1962 India-China war was driven not primarily by border disagreements or diplomatic failures, as long accepted in mainstream historical accounts, but by a deliberate American strategy pursued through the 1950s and early 1960s, reported thehindubusinessline.com Nov 19, citing a new study published in a leading United States academic journal.
The US strategy was to arm and aid Tibetan resistance movement and create the impression that India was allied with it on this mission, with the aim being to make Beijing hostile toward New Delhi and drive the later to its side, the study appears to have suggested.
The report said that drawing on declassified CIA records, diplomatic archives at the Prime Minister’s Museum & Library (PMML), the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), and documents from the Cold War International History Project, the seminal research challenges long-held narratives about the conflict. The findings – “Unravelling the Geopolitical Dimensions of the 1962 Sino–Indian Conflict: How the US Shaped the Sino–India Split” – appeared in the April edition of the Journal of Public Affairs (Wiley).
In the early 1950s, the US pinned its hopes on India for a strategic alliance in Asia. But when New Delhi chose non-alignment, Washington turned to indirect methods to cultivate influence, with Tibet quickly becoming one of its key pressure points. The report cited the study’s author Dr Lakshman of the Jindal School of International Affairs as saying that Washington’s objective at the time was to intensify tensions between India and China and block any political rapprochement.
The research is stated to indicate that the 1956 (?) Tibetan uprising provided the opening Washington had long sought. Declassified documents are stated to show that the CIA began covertly supporting Tibetan resistance groups, treating the unrest as a strategic opportunity.
Tensions intensified after 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled to India. CIA activity increased sharply, with funds, supplies, and reconnaissance missions, some launched from Pakistan, then a close US military ally, directed to Tibetan guerrillas. Pakistan’s cooperation, the paper has argued, allowed American influence to penetrate the Himalayan frontier and contributed to China’s perception of an emerging anti-Beijing alignment.
The study is sated to argue that these covert actions were never intended to support Tibet’s political cause. Instead, their purpose was to widen the India-China divide and block any possibility of bilateral accommodation. Public narratives were stated to have been shaped simultaneously: CIA assessments acknowledged that India and China might have settled their border issue peacefully. However, the public discourse generated enormous pressure, limiting New Delhi’s diplomatic manoeuvrability.
Former US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith’s memoirs is stated to corroborate the scale of CIA influence. He has described intelligence operations that shaped media narratives, funded political groups, and influenced debates within India. Dr Lakshman has characterised this as early “cognitive warfare” – the use of ideas and perceptions as strategic weapons.
By the early 1960s, while arming Pakistan, Washington was also extending financial support to India.
So, when the 1962 war broke out, China interpreted India’s actions through the lens of years of covert US activity in Tibet, viewing India as tacitly aligned with a Western effort to weaken Beijing’s hold over Tibet. As the conflict unfolded, the United States moved quickly to position itself as India’s saviour, offering military and diplomatic support that drew New Delhi closer to the Western bloc, the report said.
The study is stated to conclude that the 1962 conflict was fought as much in the realm of perception as on the battlefield. One declassified policy note from the JFK Presidential Library, quoted in the study, stated that the United States must “restrain expressions… so as to give the Chinese no pretext for alleging any American involvement.” Nevertheless, the author has argued, US covert operations achieved “much more than they desired,” pushing India and China toward collision and widening the Sino–Soviet rift.
Ultimately, the conflict forced Prime Minister Nehru to request military assistance from the United States, a significant departure from India’s long-standing non-aligned stance, and an outcome Washington quietly welcomed, the report noted.