(TibetanReview.net, Oct19’25) – There is no place for ethnic particularity under President Jinping’s drive towards political homogenisation of the People’s Republic of China and the recent removal and investigation of high-ranking officials from ethnic minority regions who held key political positions, read with other policy measures, was meant to drive this message home, according to a zamin.uz commentary Oct 14.
These developments, which took place in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi recently, signalled a shift in the Party-state’s approach to managing ethnic representation. While officially presented as part of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, these purges carry an additional political undertone. They indicate a recalibration of how the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) understands loyalty, governance, and the very idea of autonomy in minority regions, the commentary noted.
The recent purges of Qi Zhala, former chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region; Lan Tianli, the chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; and Wang Lixia, an ethnic Mongol and chairwoman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, in Jan, May and Aug 2025 respectively should be seen in this light, the commentary suggested.
They cannot be explained solely as anti-corruption measures. Rather, they represent a deeper political trend: the consolidation of ideological conformity and the dismantling of the symbolic autonomy that once underpinned China’s system of multiethnic governance. By removing officials who embodied ethnic representation, the CPC signals that loyalty to the centre outweighs cultural heritage or local legitimacy.
In this connection, the commentary noted that while previously the focus has been on promoting minority cadres who were culturally representative but politically loyal, the recent purges suggest that this balance is being redefined in favour of total ideological conformity.
Since 2020, Beijing has shown growing unease with any expression of ethnic particularism. The replacement of Mongolian with Mandarin in key school subjects in Inner Mongolia, the tightening of controls over religious institutions in Tibet, and the reorganization of cadres in Xinjiang all point to a broader ideological project that subordinates ethnic identity to a unified national identity defined by the Party.
The message is unambiguous: minority leaders must serve as the Party’s representatives to their communities, not their communities’ representatives to the Party.
Underlying this shift in policy also is Beijing’s long entertained fears that ethnic regions could become centres of alternative identity politics, particularly during times of economic slowdown or regional inequality. By weakening the autonomy of local leadership, Beijing minimizes the risk of deviation from central directives. What remains is autonomy in name, without meaningful power over policy or personnel, the commentary said.
The flip side of this policy is that the centralization of ethnic governance threatens the fragile consensus that has sustained China’s model of ethnic management since the 1980s. The new homogenization move, combined with cultural policies that dilute local traditions and languages, could breed latent discontent, it said.
While the new strategy may deliver short-term political stability, it carries significant long-term risks. It alienates minority communities, weakens the credibility of the Party’s inclusion narrative, and erodes the delicate balance between autonomy and control that has defined China’s ethnic governance model for decades, the commentary said.