OPINION
Bembya Mitruev* argues that the middle way policy, “the only sustainable official policy of the Central Tibetan Administration”, envisioned by His Holiness the Dalai Lama way back in the 1970s, is an outcome of rigorous democratic and legal procedures, and could not be changed by the simpleness of a private member’s bill, as attempted in the recent Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile session.
Recently, during the second session of the 18th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, a private member’s motion was tabled seeking to establish “Tibetan independence” as the official policy of the Central Tibetan Administration. The motion failed to secure a majority at the threshold vote on whether it should proceed to debate, receiving 15 votes in favour and 23 against, and was ultimately rejected. This episode once again underscores that, within the current legal framework, democratic procedures, international realities, and strategic considerations, the “Middle Way” remains the only sustainable official policy of the Central Tibetan Administration.
Legal and Charter Basis
The Charter of the Tibetans-in-Exile establishes the fundamental institutional framework of the Central Tibetan Administration. Under the relevant provisions (particularly Article 56 and related clauses concerning referendums and major policy matters), issues involving the fundamental interests of Tibet or significant policy changes cannot be altered lightly through an ordinary private member’s motion. They require higher thresholds and, where necessary, a public referendum. Sikyong Penpa Tsering’s procedural objections were grounded precisely in this institutional logic: if established policy could be overturned at will by ordinary resolutions, the stability of parliamentary procedures and the authority of the Charter would be undermined.
The Middle Way is not a temporary decision. It is an official position that emerged from prolonged internal discussion, was advocated by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, has been repeatedly affirmed by the Parliament, and enjoys majority support within the exile community. In the mid-1990s, an opinion survey on policy direction showed that a majority supported the Middle Way or deferred to the decisions of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Establishing it as official policy accords with the Charter’s requirement of caution on matters of major importance. Any shift to an independence policy would likewise have to follow equally rigorous democratic and legal procedures, and could not be effected by a single private member’s motion.
Historical Legitimacy and Democratic Consensus
The Middle Way was proposed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the 1970s and formally elaborated in the late 1980s. Its core is to seek genuine national regional autonomy for the three traditional provinces of Tibet within the framework of recognising China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, in order to protect language, religion, culture, and national identity. It explicitly rejects the repressive policies of the current situation while forgoing the immediate pursuit of complete independence. This position has been repeatedly confirmed by successive Parliaments-in-Exile and has been upheld by the elected leadership after His Holiness devolved political authority in 2011.
Discussion within the exile Tibetan community between independence and autonomy has never ceased; some continue to uphold the Rangzen (independence) demand. This is a legitimate expression of democratic pluralism. Nevertheless, the formation of official policy is the outcome of a collective democratic process, not of individual will. Sikyong Penpa Tsering’s reaffirmation of the Middle Way after his re-election reflects the mainstream political direction expressed through the elections. A forced shift to independence without broad consensus and formal procedures would weaken the institutional legitimacy of the exile government itself and undermine internal unity.
International Impact and External Recognition
At the international level, virtually all major countries—including the United States, India, and European Union member states—officially recognise Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. They support dialogue, express concern for human rights and cultural protection, and have repeatedly stated their support for the Middle Way or for “resolving the Tibet issue through dialogue.” The White House, the European Parliament, the Canadian Parliament, and others have publicly affirmed this non-violent, mutually beneficial path.
Were the exile government formally to adopt an independence policy, it would face serious risk of international isolation: many governments that currently support human rights and dialogue might reduce engagement for fear of being labelled as supporting “separatism.” India, as the host country of the exile administration, has strategic considerations that favour border stability rather than open support for independence. The Middle Way, by contrast, enables the international community to continue focusing on the Tibet issue, promoting dialogue, and maintaining diplomatic and moral support for the Central Tibetan Administration without challenging China’s sovereignty narrative. This is the key reason its external acceptance far exceeds that of the independence position.
Practical Feasibility and Strategic Rationality
China’s overwhelming military, economic, and diplomatic advantages render the immediate realisation of complete independence unrealistic in the foreseeable future. Insisting on an independence policy could reinforce China’s “separatist forces” narrative, further tighten controls over Tibetans inside Tibet, and shrink the space for international mediation. The Middle Way seeks genuine autonomy within the framework of the Chinese Constitution. It corresponds to Deng Xiaoping’s statement that “apart from independence, all other issues can be discussed,” and was concretised in the 2008 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.
Although China has so far given no substantive response, the Middle Way keeps the window for dialogue open and avoids pushing the issue into zero-sum confrontation. It balances the core Tibetan interest in cultural survival with China’s concerns for sovereignty and stability, constituting a “win-win” design that also accords with Buddhist middle-path thought and the principle of non-violence. In a prolonged stalemate, it enables the exile government to continue international advocacy, human-rights monitoring, and community-building rather than descending into an isolated extreme position.
Maintaining Unity and the Sustainability of the Long-Term Movement
Tibetans in exile are dispersed worldwide and hold diverse views. Frequent shifts in official policy would easily exacerbate divisions and weaken collective capacity for action. As a democratically affirmed consensus foundation, the Middle Way helps concentrate strength on the urgent task of protecting the language, religion, and culture of Tibetans inside Tibet. At the same time, it does not prohibit individuals or organisations from expressing independence aspirations; it merely defines the official position and the boundaries of official action.
Sikyong Penpa Tsering has recently emphasised that even if dialogue yields no results for a long time, the Tibetan movement will continue for decades. The key lies in institutional development, unity, and non-violence. The Middle Way is precisely the vehicle of this long-term strategy.
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* Bem Mitruev is a Buddhist Scholar & Tibetan Translator, the first Acharya in Russia and specialist in Buddhist Philosophy & Kalmyk Heritage.